By Adolf
President Anura Kumara Dissanayake has completed 2 years in office. The first President to sit in office without a 50% majority. After 2 years he is still shouting on stages like a cowboy and forgetting to deliver on his many promises . Other than arresting people. Certainly the National People’s Power (NPP) now command one of Sri Lanka’s strongest parliamentary mandates in recent history. In November 2024, the NPP won 6.863 million votes, or 61.56% of valid votes, and 159 of Parliament’s 225 seats—more than 70% of Parliament thanks to Sajith Premadasa’s incompetence. That is a powerful mandate. But it is not a permanent political consensus, nor a blank cheque.
Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s experience offers the clearest warning. In November 2019, he won 6.924 million votes, or 52.25%, in the presidential election. Eight months later, the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) won 6.854 million votes, or 59.09%, and 145 parliamentary seats. Although the SLPP did not win a two-thirds majority on its own, the government subsequently secured the constitutional majority needed for major parliamentary business.
Yet within two years, that formidable mandate had collapsed. The government fell amid economic crisis, public anger and a loss of confidence in its leadership.
The lesson for President Dissanayake is direct: a supermajority must be converted into effective, credible and accountable governance before public confidence begins to erode.
The NPP’s parliamentary victory also requires careful interpretation. Only two months earlier, at the September 2024 presidential election, Dissanayake received 42.31% of the vote, while Sajith Premadasa received 32.76% and Ranil Wickremesinghe 17.27%. Together, Premadasa and Wickremesinghe won more than half of the first-preference votes.
In the parliamentary election, however, the SJB received only 1.969 million votes, or 17.66%, while the New Democratic Front won 500,835 votes, or 4.49%. The SLPP collapsed to 350,429 votes, or 3.14%, winning just three seats. Opposition fragmentation, weakened alliances and different voter participation patterns helped produce the NPP’s overwhelming parliamentary majority.
The Election Commission recorded 17.14 million registered voters, but only 11.815 million votes were cast, representing 68.93% turnout. The NPP’s 6.863 million votes therefore represented about 40% of the registered electorate, even though they amounted to 61.56% of valid votes. The proportional representation system magnified the effect of the opposition’s collapse, converting that vote share into 159 of 225 seats, or 70.7% of Parliament.
This gives the NPP an extraordinary opportunity to govern. It does not guarantee permanent support. They must not only prosecute the opposition. Their Ministers should be dealt with in line with the others.
On moral issues, there can be no left or right—only right and wrong. Political ideology cannot replace integrity, transparency, accountability, institutional independence or respect for the rule of law.
President Dissanayake should therefore treat the supermajority not as a blank cheque, but as a greater responsibility. Its legitimacy will depend on economic performance, institutional credibility, clean governance and the delivery of the change promised to voters.
Conclusion
Sri Lankan voters have repeatedly granted governments overwhelming mandates—and just as decisively withdrawn their support when those mandates failed to produce results and kicked or chased them out like a pack of dogs . He also needs to take governing seriously, for example there is simply no logic in bringing his party supporters together for a rally over the weekend when he should be speaking at the UN and meeting other world leaders. He is President for all Sri Lankans.