By:Staff Writer
August 14, Colombo (LNW): A constitutional and national security storm has erupted over the arrest of former Navy Commander Admiral Nishantha Ulugetenne, with the Defence Ministry’s public assurance that “the law applies equally to all” accused of masking a deeper jurisdictional breach.
At the heart of the dispute lies one legal question: did the alleged offence occur during naval service and in connection with operational duties? If so, Sections 34 and 131 of the Navy Act No. 34 of 1950 mandate trial by court martial—not in a civilian court. If unrelated to service, civilian jurisdiction applies, Jihan Hameed Guest Columist of the Daily FT new paper stated ina lengthy article
The decisive trigger is the CID’s B Report to the Magistrate’s Court, which classified the alleged offence as a “personal matter” unrelated to naval duties—removing the Navy Act from the equation and placing the case under civilian courts. Critics warn this is not a matter of preference but statutory obligation, and if the CID’s classification is wrong, it amounts to a procedural bypass with grave security implications, she pointed out.
Legal experts note that the CID, as a branch of the Sri Lanka Police under the Inspector General of Police (IGP), is tasked with investigating facts, not deciding law. By determining the Navy Act does not apply, the CID has allegedly stepped beyond its mandate—encroaching on the legal sovereignty of the armed forces.
The Defence Ministry’s justification that the Navy Act is irrelevant because Admiral Ulugetenne is retired collapses under binding Supreme Court precedent. In SC FR 556/2009 (Capt. A.D. Senaratne de Silva v. Military Police and others), the Court ruled that jurisdiction is based on when the alleged offence occurred, not the officer’s retirement status. This means service-related offences remain under military jurisdiction even post-retirement.
Allowing the CID’s approach to stand could set a dangerous precedent—routing any sensitive case involving senior military officers through civilian police to bypass court martial procedures. It would also hand effective control of military law to the IGP via administrative classification, undermining the armed forces’ disciplinary autonomy.
Critics stress that the Navy Act’s purpose is not ceremonial—it safeguards the chain of command, classified information, and operational sovereignty. Trying a former Director of Naval Intelligence in an open civilian court risks exposing wartime secrets, as civilian proceedings lack the strict security protocols of courts martial.
Under law, the chain of responsibility is clear:
Commander of the Navy – assesses service connection of offence.
Navy Legal Division – reviews jurisdictional applicability.
Defence Ministry – enforces military jurisdiction where applicable.
Attorney General – provides final legal oversight.
Failure by all four to act is not just a procedural lapse—it is institutional inaction. The President, as Commander-in-Chief, is the only constitutional authority bridging military and civilian spheres and must ensure jurisdictional accuracy before cases reach court.
If the B Report’s classification is right, the Navy’s exclusion stands. If wrong, the CID’s move is a direct bypass of military law. Observers warn that in a “war on jurisdiction,” silence is not neutrality—it is surrender.
