Due to influence of the Intertropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ), and likely develop of a low-level atmospheric disturbance in the vicinity of the island, an increase in rainfall is expected across the island from today (06) and over the next few days.
Showers or thundershowers will occur at most places of the island after 1.00 pm.
Showers are likely in the Southern and Eastern provinces during the morning too.
Heavy falls above 100 mm are likely at some places in Sabaragamuwa, Central, Uva and North-central provinces.
Misty conditions can be expected at some places in Central, Sabaragamuwa and Uva provinces during the early hours of the morning.
The general public is kindly requested to take adequate precautions to minimize damages caused by temporary localized strong winds and lightning during thundershowers.
May 05, Colombo (LNW): The parliamentary debate over the $2.5 million treasury fraud turned explosive today, with opposition MPs unleashing a blistering political assault on Deputy Finance Minister Anil Jayantha and Finance Secretary Dr. Harshana Suriyapperema even as Central Bank Governor Dr. Nandalal Weerasinghe quietly left the country.
Throughout the heated session, Suriyapperema and Jayantha bore the brunt of opposition fury over the scandal that has already claimed the life of a senior public servant. Lawmakers demanded answers on how lower-level officials were suspended while top Treasury leadership remained in their posts.
At the last COPF meeting, Suriyapperema had testified that the first seven fraudulent payments were executed by the Central Bank under Governor Weerasinghe. But with the Governor conspicuously absent from the accountability chain, opposition frustration boiled over.
UNP parliamentarian and former Finance Minister Ravi Karunanayake repeatedly accused Weerasinghe and the CBSL of operating “above the law,” hiding behind Central Bank independence granted under the IMF agreement.
Amid this critical juncture global conflict, escalating living costs, rupee depreciation, and a multi-million dollar fraud Central Bank sources confirmed to LNW that Dr. Weerasinghe has left the country on a personal visit to Dubai, though media widely reports he has traveled to Australia to visit family.
The CBSL has yet to formally address its role in the fraud.
May 05, Colombo (LNW): Sarvajana Balaya leader Dilith Jayaweera launched a scathing parliamentary broadside today, accusing the government of systematically eroding judicial independence, misusing state power, and recklessly ignoring the mysterious deaths of state officials.
Jayaweera charged that Cabinet ministers and the President have made “unprecedented public declarations” regarding pending Supreme Court judgments, a coordinated rhetoric he argued is designed to intimidate the opposition and challenge the very independence of Sri Lanka’s highest court. He noted that the Justice Minister has been placed in a “highly uncomfortable position” as a result.
The Jayaweera further accused the government of leveraging state and executive machinery to orchestrate May Day rallies aimed at spreading fear and dismantling democratic principles.
Raising grave alarms, Jayaweera pointed to state officials dying under mysterious circumstances, condemning the administration for lightly dismissing the issue instead of engaging in the serious dialogue it warrants.
“Despite global conflicts and severe domestic economic challenges, the government failed to deliver a meaningful message to the country’s workforce,” he said, adding that officials focused entirely on intimidating political opponents rather than informing citizens of harsh economic realities.
The strong rebuke signals deepening political friction as parliamentary scrutiny intensifies.
May 05, Colombo (LNW): The recent hantavirus scare linked to the cruise vessel MV Hondius has exposed a familiar but uncomfortable truth: the world remains dangerously reactive, rather than prepared, when confronting zoonotic diseases. While global authorities have downplayed the immediate risk, the outbreak underscores a deeper structural vulnerability—one that countries like Sri Lanka can ill afford to ignore.
Hantavirus is not new, nor is it particularly mysterious. It is a rodent-borne zoonotic virus group, transmitted primarily through inhalation of aerosolised particles from rodent urine, droppings, or saliva. Less commonly, infection may occur through contaminated food or bites.
Yet despite its well-established transmission pathways, it remains a high-consequence pathogen due to its capacity to escalate rapidly from flu-like symptoms to severe respiratory distress, shock, and death.
A Disease Defined by Severity, Not Spread
Unlike Covid-19, hantavirus is not typically a mass-transmission pandemic agent. However, this distinction should not breed complacency. The pulmonary syndrome variant, common in the Americas, carries significant lethality, while the haemorrhagic fever with renal syndrome variant affects Asia and Europe on a large scale—estimated at around 150,000 cases annually.
The numbers from 2025 alone are sobering. Across the Americas, 229 confirmed cases resulted in 59 deaths, translating to a fatality rate of 25.7 per cent. Argentina, the epicentre in the region, reported 66 cases and 21 deaths—a striking 32 per cent lethality rate, higher than previous years.
This is not a mild disease. There is no widely available antiviral cure. Treatment is largely supportive, meaning outcomes depend heavily on early detection, clinical capacity, and overall health system readiness.
The MV Hondius Incident: A Warning Shot
The unfolding situation aboard the MV Hondius has transformed hantavirus from a regional concern into a global talking point. With multiple deaths, at least one confirmed case, and several suspected infections, the incident illustrates how quickly uncertainty can spiral in confined environments.
What makes this outbreak particularly unsettling is the ambiguity surrounding transmission. Hantavirus is usually not spread between humans. However, the Andes virus strain—prevalent in parts of South America—has demonstrated limited human-to-human transmission under close and prolonged exposure.
This nuance matters. It shifts hantavirus from being purely an environmental hazard to a potential, albeit limited, interpersonal threat. Even if the global risk remains low, as the World Health Organisation suggests, the implications for surveillance and containment are significant.
Why Sri Lanka Cannot Afford Indifference
Sri Lanka’s geographic and socio-economic realities make it vulnerable to zoonotic spillovers. Rural housing conditions, agricultural practices, and waste management challenges create ideal conditions for rodent-human interaction—the primary driver of hantavirus transmission.
Environmental change further compounds the risk. As ecosystems shift and human activity encroaches into wildlife habitats, opportunities for spillover increase. Hantavirus, deeply rooted in wildlife reservoirs such as rodents, shrews, and even bats, cannot be eradicated in the conventional sense.
The lesson is clear: prevention is not optional—it is the only viable defence.
A Blueprint for Preparedness
If hantavirus were to reach Sri Lanka’s borders, the response must be immediate and multi-layered. The Pan American Health Organisation has already outlined the essential pillars: strengthened surveillance, rapid laboratory diagnosis, effective clinical management, and intersectoral risk reduction.
For Sri Lanka, this translates into:
Enhanced surveillance systems capable of detecting unusual respiratory or renal syndromes early.
Laboratory readiness to identify hantavirus strains swiftly and accurately.
Public awareness campaigns focused on rodent control, safe cleaning practices, and environmental hygiene.
Healthcare system preparedness, particularly in managing severe respiratory cases requiring intensive support.
Equally critical is the need for coordinated communication. Panic thrives in silence, and misinformation fills the void left by indecision.
A Call to Leadership
Hantavirus is often described as a “low-risk” global threat. That characterisation, while technically accurate, is dangerously misleading. The true risk lies not in widespread transmission, but in high fatality, limited treatment options, and persistent ecological reservoirs.
It is, in essence, a silent threat—one that does not overwhelm systems through volume, but through severity.
This is where political accountability must come into sharp focus. Sri Lanka cannot wait for an outbreak to begin drafting its response. The country’s Minister of Health, Dr. Nalinda Jayatissa, must proactively address the nation on this issue.
A clear, evidence-based statement outlining preparedness measures, potential risks, and public guidance would not only reassure citizens but also signal that the government is not sleepwalking into the next public health crisis.
The absence of such leadership would be more than an oversight—it would be negligence. The world has already learned this lesson the hard way. There is little excuse for repeating it.
May 05, LNW (Colombo): In a blistering parliamentary address today, SJB senior leader and COPF Chairman Dr. Harsha De Silva delivered a devastating takedown of the government’s financial administration, firmly crushing days of propaganda suggesting his imminent defection to President Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s camp.
Dr. De Silva exposed severe procedural breakdowns, revealing that the Department of External Resources was improperly involved in debt transactions, a function legally reserved exclusively for the Debt Management Department. He attributed these structural failures to the appointment of inexperienced Planning Service officers as Director Generals, sidelining seasoned Sri Lanka Administrative Service (SLAS) officials.
Turning to the ongoing treasury fraud, the economist questioned how lower-level directors authorized massive foreign currency payments, citing specific transfers of $100,000 and $900,000, without oversight. He warned that missing funds will ultimately burden the taxpaying public unless recovered directly from the responsible.
“The Treasury Secretary lacks necessary financial management experience,” Dr. De Silva charged.
He further expressed frustration that top finance officials, including the Finance secretary, have evaded the Public Finance Committee for three consecutive sessions prompting a formal complaint to the President.
The speech came despite a sustained disinformation campaign by government-aligned YouTubers predicting Dr. De Silva would join the administration alongside Eran Wickramaratne.
Government-aligned popular YouTuber channels and news platforms have launched a concerted propaganda campaign claiming that top Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB) leaders are poised to defect to President Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s administration, speculation that intensified after a senior SJB economist accepted a key state appointment.
The rumour mill reached a fever pitch following the appointment of former SJB senior leader and economist Eran Wickramaratne to spearhead Sri Lanka Cricket under the President’s directive.
Government-backed online voices predicted that SJB’s prominent economist and MP Dr. Harsha De Silva would follow suit.
Adding fuel to the fire, a JVP strongman and Minister of Agriculture declared at the official May Day rally that “a few from the opposition will be taken into the government.”
However, Dr. De Silva broke his silence in emphatic fashion. Taking the stage at the SJB’s own May Day rally, he delivered what party insiders described as an “uncharacteristically sharp” speech, though he has otherwise remained silent on the propaganda questioning his loyalty.
Dr. De Silva continues to refuse engagement with claims that he is preparing to align with President Dissanayake.
Where I currently live, banking regulations are enforced with seriousness and consequence. Any deviation from established norms—however small—can lead directly to legal action. In contrast, Sri Lanka continues to lag. Too often, individuals and institutions appear to get away with serious lapses, carrying on as though nothing has happened. Against this backdrop, National Development Bank’s latest results raise more questions than they answer. A reported Rs. 1.75 billion profit after tax for 1Q 2026—after adjusting for a Rs. 13.2 billion fraud—demands scrutiny, not applause. Because beneath the carefully structured narrative of “restatements” and “adjustments” lies a deeper issue: credibility.
Let’s strip this down.
The bank says the full financial impact of the fraud—Rs. 13.2 billion—has now been recognised across prior periods. Of this, Rs. 9.62 billion is allocated to FY2025, Rs. 2.67 billion to 1Q 2026, and smaller amounts to earlier periods. On paper, this creates the impression of closure. Clean it up, spread it out, move on.
But that’s precisely the problem.
If FY2025 originally showed a profit of Rs. 11.04 billion and is now restated to Rs. 5.90 billion, what exactly are we to believe? That a bank can lose nearly half its profit due to fraud—and still present a narrative of “resilience”? More importantly, what does this say about the quality of oversight that allowed such a gap to exist in the first place?
The numbers begin to look even more uncomfortable when viewed across periods. A Rs. 13.2 billion fraud offset against roughly Rs. 11 billion of annual profit effectively wipes out an entire year’s earnings—and then some. The remaining gap doesn’t just disappear; it bleeds into future reporting periods, distorting comparability and raising doubts about what is truly “underlying performance” versus what is accounting engineering.
And yet, we are told that core banking operations are “strong.”
Perhaps. But that is not the point.
The issue is trust.
When a bank asks stakeholders to focus on “adjusted” profits, it is effectively asking them to ignore the very event that defines its current risk profile. Fraud of this magnitude is not a one-off accounting anomaly—it is a failure of systems, controls, governance, and culture. You cannot adjust that away.
Even more concerning is the continuity.
The same management team remains. The same auditors remain. The same supervisory architecture remains.
So the obvious question arises: what has fundamentally changed?
A forensic audit by Deloitte has been commissioned, and that is welcome. But forensic audits, by design, are retrospective. They tell us what went wrong—not necessarily whether the conditions that enabled the failure have been decisively corrected.
Meanwhile, the bank reports improving asset quality, stable margins, growing fee income, and sound capital ratios. All comforting metrics. But in the absence of restored confidence, they risk being seen as peripheral.
Because markets don’t just price earnings—they price credibility.
Then there is the unresolved question of dividends. If FY2025 profits have been materially restated downward, on what basis were dividend decisions made or justified? Were distributions aligned with true profitability, or with a now-revised version of it? This is not a technical detail—it goes directly to shareholder fairness and governance integrity.
What’s happening now?
What we are witnessing is a familiar pattern.
A crisis occurs. Losses are recognised—eventually. Numbers are restated. Assurances are given. And then, gradually, normalcy resumes.
But nothing really changes.
This is not just about one bank. It is a reflection of a broader systemic issue—where accountability is diffused, consequences are limited, and institutional memory is short.
Sri Lanka has seen this before.
The real test is not whether NDB can report a profit in the next quarter. It is whether it can rebuild trust in a way that is visible, credible, and irreversible. That means more than adjusted numbers. It means accountability at the highest levels, transparency that goes beyond compliance, and governance reforms that are not cosmetic.Until then, skepticism is not cynicism. It is common sense
In a explosive press conference yesterday, senior lawyer and Sarvajana Balaya General Secretary Ranjan Seneviratne accused Finance Ministry Secretary Dr. Harshana Suriyapperema of holding dual citizenship in Sri Lanka and Australia a direct violation of the 21st Amendment to the Constitution.
Citing documentation, Seneviratne revealed that Suriyapperema allegedly obtained dual citizenship certificate No. C9 058 28 from the Controller of Immigration and Emigration on February 3, 2010. The respected legal figure questioned how a dual citizen could serve as an MP and Deputy Minister while taking an oath under Article 63 to uphold the very Constitution he was violating.
“Did the party leadership know? Was his resignation from parliament an attempt to suppress this revelation?” Seneviratne demanded. “Can the nation entrust its Treasury to a man who deliberately breached the supreme law?”
The allegations come amid an ongoing $2.5 Mn treasury fraud probe that already saw six lower-level officials suspended and one tragic loss of life. Seneviratne insisted blame cannot be forced onto minor officials insisting ultimate accountability rests with President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, the Finance Minister, and Secretary Suriyapperema.
The dual citizenship row has now triggered severe headaches for the ruling party. A final decision on Suriyapperema’s fate is expected this week unless he personally takes on the opposition’s challenge and publicly clarifies whether he has legally revoked his Australian citizenship, and exactly when.
Sri Lanka’s USD 2.5 million Treasury cyber heist has entered a critical phase, with new findings sharpening focus on the role of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka in the country’s debt servicing systemboth historically and during the recent transition to the Treasury.
The fraud, carried out through ten transactions between November 2025 and January 2026, has exposed weaknesses not only in cybersecurity but also in institutional accountability. While attention has been directed at the Treasury’s Public Debt Management Office (PDMO), the timeline of events places significant responsibility on the Central Bank.
For decades, the Central Bank functioned as the government’s primary agent in managing public debt. This included handling external repayments, coordinating with international creditors, and maintaining settlement systems. Its Public Debt Department was central to ensuring the credibility and accuracy of sovereign debt transactions.
That long-standing arrangement changed on January 1, 2026, when debt management operations were formally transferred to the Treasury’s PDMO. However, the transition did not mark a clean break in responsibility.
Evidence presented during parliamentary hearings confirms that seven of the ten fraudulent transactions occurred between November and December 2025, when the Central Bank was still fully responsible for debt servicing. The remaining three transactions took place in January 2026 under the Treasury’s authority.
This overlap has become a key issue in determining accountability.
The fraud targeted funds intended for a bilateral repayment to Australia and was executed using a business email compromise scheme. Hackers exploited weaknesses in communication systems, sending fraudulent payment instructions through a spoofed domain that closely resembled the legitimate creditor’s email address.
Despite the scale and sensitivity of these transactions, standard verification procedures were not followed. There were no test transfers, no independent confirmations, and no escalation of system warnings that had flagged potential risks.
These failures raise serious questions about the effectiveness of internal controls during the Central Bank’s tenure. Given its long-standing experience and established protocols, critics argue that such repeated breaches should have been detected earlier.
The Central Bank’s current role further complicates matters. Its Financial Intelligence Unit is now leading efforts to trace the stolen funds and investigate potential money laundering, in coordination with law enforcement agencies. This has led to concerns about a conflict of interest, as the institution is effectively examining a failure that occurred largely under its own oversight.
The delay in detecting the fraud has also drawn scrutiny. Although irregularities were reportedly identified in January 2026, authorities only confirmed the losses months later after foreign counterparts raised concerns. This delay spans both institutional periods but includes a critical phase when the Central Bank still held authority.
The transition to the PDMO was intended to modernize Sri Lanka’s debt management system. Instead, it has highlighted gaps in coordination, staffing, and oversight. The Treasury has faced criticism for relying on inexperienced personnel, but the Central Bank’s silence regarding its own role continues to raise concerns.
This case unfolds against the backdrop of Sri Lanka’s broader debt challenges following its recent economic crisis. In such a context, the integrity of debt servicing systems is essential not only for financial stability but also for maintaining international confidence.
As investigations continue and calls for independent oversight grow, the focus remains on whether the Central Bank can clearly account for its actions during the period when most of the fraudulent transactions took place.
Sri Lanka’s latest VAT reform proposal is being framed as a necessary step toward fiscal stability, but beneath the policy objectives lies a growing concern: the cumulative impact on consumers. As the government moves to widen the tax base and improve compliance, households may face a steady climb in the cost of goods and services.
At the center of the reform is a significant lowering of the VAT registration threshold, effectively pulling thousands of previously exempt small businesses into the tax system? This structural change is expected to increase tax collection, but it also alters pricing dynamics across the market. SMEs, now liable for VAT, are likely to adjust their pricing to maintain margins, leading to incremental price hikes that will ultimately affect end consumers.
The Bill also introduces VAT on cross-border digital services, a rapidly growing segment of consumer expenditure. Streaming platforms, cloud-based tools, and other online services provided by foreign companies will now fall within the tax net. While businesses registered for VAT may be exempt under certain conditions, individual consumers will not have that relief, making digital consumption more expensive.
Further compounding the situation is the increase in VAT applied to financial services. With the rate rising to 20.5%, customers could experience higher banking costs, from transaction fees to loan-related expenses. These changes, though sector-specific, have wide-reaching implications given the central role of financial services in daily economic activity.
The government has paired these tax measures with stricter enforcement mechanisms. Penalties for non-compliance have been raised dramatically, and authorities now have expanded powers, including the ability to publish taxpayer information. Additionally, enhanced coordination between tax authorities and Customs aims to close loopholes and improve monitoring.
Despite these efforts, the projected additional revenue estimated at around Rs. 700 million appears relatively small when set against the broader revenue target exceeding Rs. 2,400 billion. This raises a critical question: whether the incremental fiscal gain justifies the widespread impact on consumers and small businesses.
As compliance burdens increase and taxation spreads across more sectors, the overall effect is clear. While the reforms may strengthen government revenue streams, they are also likely to tighten household finances, making affordability a central concern in the months ahead.
