By Roger Srivasan

Discipline, merit, and the courage to enforce standards turned a vulnerable island into a global benchmark. Sri Lanka now faces a similar test.

When Singapore separated from Malaysia in 1965, few expected it to survive, let alone succeed. It was a small, anxious island with no natural resources, no hinterland, and no margin for error. Jobs were scarce, housing was inadequate, and social tensions ran high. Many assumed it would stumble along for a generation before quietly fading into irrelevance.
What followed instead was one of the most deliberate national transformations of the modern era.

Singapore did not rise because it was lucky.
It rose because it chose to work — methodically, relentlessly, and without excuses.
That choice, more than geography or fortune, is what separates Singapore from so many nations that had far more and achieved far less.

Order Before Comfort

Under Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore made an early and deeply unpopular decision: order before populism, competence before comfort.
The government did not promise instant prosperity. It promised something far less glamorous but far more powerful — a state that functioned. Roads were built properly. Laws were enforced consistently. Institutions were designed to outlast individuals.

Corruption, often excused elsewhere as cultural or inevitable, was treated as an existential threat. The message was stark: if dishonesty takes root, everything else collapses.
Singapore did not begin with wealth.
It began with discipline.

When Corruption Meets Consequence
Singapore’s intolerance of corruption is not rhetorical — it is enforced.

When S. Iswaran, a senior cabinet minister, was investigated and jailed for accepting inducements, there was no hedging, no tribal defence, and no political theatre. The system moved, and the system held.

For ordinary citizens, that moment reinforced something priceless: trust. People knew the queue would move, not be jumped. A bribe was no longer a shortcut — it was a risk.

For the world, the signal was unmistakable: rules apply upward, not selectively.
Many countries condemn corruption. Few punish it without fear or favour.

Merit Before Noise

One of Singapore’s quiet revolutions was its refusal to confuse loudness with leadership.
From schools to the civil service, the principle was simple: merit first. Not connections. Not surnames. Not slogans.
This did not produce perfection, but it produced predictability. Effort had meaning. Competence had a pathway. Parents began to believe their children could succeed without knowing the “right person.”

Predictability, more than rhetoric, became the oxygen of progress.

Power Without Dynasty

When Lee Kuan Yew stepped down after decades in office, he did not treat the state as an inheritance. Power was not handed down like family silver. Institutions remained intact; leadership evolved.

Even when his son, Lee Hsien Loong, later became Prime Minister, it followed a long political apprenticeship — not an automatic coronation.
The symbolism mattered. The message was unmistakable: the state does not belong to a family.

Nations rise when institutions outlive personalities.
Paying for Integrity — and Demanding It
Singapore made a controversial but pragmatic choice: it paid its top public officials very well.
The logic was unsentimental. Attract capable people who could earn more elsewhere. Remove financial temptation as an excuse. Make corruption both immoral and irrational.
But the second half of the bargain was unforgiving. High pay came with ruthless accountability. Betrayal was punished severely.
Cheap virtue was replaced with expensive integrity.

Learning Without Ego

Singapore wanted world-class ports and logistics, it looked outward rather than inward. At the time, Norway was widely regarded as possessing the world’s most advanced maritime logistics and port systems. Singapore dispatched teams of its own professionals to study Norway’s methods, absorb its discipline, and adapt what worked at home. There was no national shame in learning — only urgency.

Today, Singapore has not only matched that standard but, in many respects, surpassed it, emerging as the world’s premier maritime and logistics hub.

What This Means for Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka does not need to become Singapore to transform itself. It needs something far more achievable: Singaporean seriousness.
Seriousness about enforcing laws upward, not selectively.
Seriousness about appointing people for ability, not loyalty.
Seriousness about learning from others without wounded pride.
Seriousness about building institutions that outlive elections.

History does not repeat itself neatly, nor does it anoint replicas. Yet moments arise when a nation encounters a leader whose instincts align with institutional repair rather than political indulgence. In that sense, Anura Kumara Dissanayake may represent Sri Lanka’s closest equivalent to a Lee Kuan Yew–style moment — not a replication of a man, but the emergence of a governing ethic.

This is not a coronation.
It is a test.
The Real Lesson of Singapore
Singapore’s success was not a miracle of wealth.
It was a triumph of choices.
Choices made early.
Choices enforced consistently.
Choices protected from sentimentality.
The island worked because it refused to pretend.
And that is the most hopeful lesson of all — because if success depends not on destiny, but on discipline, then Sri Lanka’s story is not finished.

Sri Lanka’s fragile debt recovery is once again under strain as economic growth shows signs of losing momentum, raising serious questions about the country’s ability to manage both internal and external debt obligations beyond 2026. Despite achieving short-term macroeconomic stability through harsh fiscal consolidation, analysts warn that without deeper structural reforms and stronger foreign investment, the current trajectory risks trapping the economy in a low-growth, high-debt cycle.

According to First Capital Holdings PLC, GDP growth is expected to slow to 3–4% in 2026 and 2027, down from an estimated 4-5% in 2025. This deceleration reflects weakening consumer demand, rising interest rates, limited reform progress, and the economic fallout from Cyclone Ditwah. While fiscal discipline has stabilised inflation and the currency, growth at these levels is insufficient to meaningfully reduce Sri Lanka’s debt-to-GDP ratio.

Sri Lanka’s public debt burden already among the highest in emerging markets remains vulnerable to even modest economic shocks. Analysts caution that the exceptional trade surplus recorded last year, which supported foreign reserve accumulation and external debt servicing, is unlikely to be repeated. As imports rise due to post-cyclone reconstruction and easing vehicle import restrictions, the trade balance is expected to swing back into deficit, increasing pressure on reserves, interest rates, and the exchange rate.

External debt servicing capacity remains a central concern. Foreign reserves are projected to rise only marginally to around $7.25 billion in 2026 and $7.5 billion in 2027, constrained by higher imports, ongoing debt repayments, and a depreciating rupee. With the currency expected to weaken by about 5% in 2026, the local-currency cost of servicing foreign debt will rise, further straining fiscal space.

Domestically, higher interest rates are adding to the government’s internal debt burden. The Average Weighted Prime Lending Rate is expected to climb to 10-11% in the second half of 2026, pushing up Treasury yields and increasing debt-servicing costs. This dynamic risks crowding out private investment at a time when growth needs to accelerate.

First Capital warns that growth below 5% will keep debt ratios elevated above IMF projections through 2028. Only a sustained acceleration in growth driven by SOE restructuring, tariff reform, digitalisation, and faster land and trade reformscan place debt on a declining path. Without these changes, Sri Lanka faces the danger of stabilising today only to stumble into another debt crisis tomorrow.

Sri Lanka’s ambitious renewable energy drive is facing a serious credibility test as policy uncertainty, administrative delays, and controversial decision-making under the JVP-led National People’s Power (NPP) government begin to erode investor confidence in the power sector.

Local renewable energy developers supplying nearly 3,300 megawatts of clean electricity to the national grid warn that the industry is approaching a breaking point. At the centre of the controversy is the Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB), operating under the Energy and Power Ministry, whose recent actions critics describe as amateurish and economically reckless.

Since February 2025, the CEB has imposed repeated power curtailments on grid-connected renewable plants during weekends and public holidays. While the utility frames the move as an emergency grid-management measure, industry representatives argue that an “emergency” recurring for over nine months exposes deeper planning failures. These curtailments have resulted in an estimated Rs. 2 billion loss to developers, with ground-mounted solar operators reporting income drops of around 15 percent.

What has alarmed investors further is that many of these plants fall under the “must-run” category defined in legally binding Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs). The unilateral reduction of output, developers say, amounts to a breach of contract and undermines the sanctity of long-term investment guarantees.

Compounding the crisis is the prolonged delay in implementing Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS), despite cabinet approval of tariffs and tax concessions. Developers are ready to store surplus daytime solar power and dispatch it during peak evening demand, reducing reliance on costly diesel generation. Yet five months after ministerial approval, the CEB has failed to issue implementation guidelines or amend PPAs, effectively stalling progress.

Critics argue that these delays reflect weak sectoral leadership. The Energy Ministry, headed by a minister facing unresolved corruption allegations, has struggled to inspire confidence among investors or financial institutions. While the government publicly champions energy independence and green growth, operational decisions paint a conflicting picture.

The proposed National Electricity Policy 2025 has intensified these fears. Plans to abolish the Feed-in Tariff system in favour of competitive bidding threaten the survival of small and medium-scale local developers who form the backbone of Sri Lanka’s renewable sector. Additionally, proposals to allow uncompensated curtailment and enforce rupee-only contracts expose investors to severe financial and currency risks.

Bankers warn that continued revenue disruption could lead to widespread loan defaults, triggering a future non-performing loan crisis. As Sri Lanka seeks to meet its 2030 renewable energy targets, analysts caution that sidelining private sector partners through erratic policy may derail the transition altogether.

Sri Lanka’s power sector is once again at a crossroads, with the government pushing ahead with a hastily reworked restructuring of the Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB) that critics warn could destabilise the national grid rather than reform it. Trade unions, engineers, and energy sector analysts argue that the new plan dilutes safeguards embedded in the previous Ranil Wickremesinghe administration’s more comprehensive unbundling proposal, while accelerating implementation under pressure from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Under the Wickremesinghe government, the restructuring of the CEB was envisioned as a phased and tightly regulated process. The proposal called for unbundling the utility into six to eight distinct entities, with clear functional separation between generation, transmission, distribution, system operations, and ancillary services. Crucially, state control over strategic assets—such as grid management, transmission infrastructure, and national system operations—was explicitly protected, while private participation was to be limited, transparent, and performance-based.

The current government’s revised plan, however, compresses this transition into a far narrower timeline. It proposes dissolving the CEB and replacing it with six companies, all registered under the Companies Act, with assurances that they remain state-owned. While technically compliant with the Sri Lanka Electricity Act and its amendments, sector experts argue the plan prioritises legal form over operational readiness.

The most significant weakness lies in the absence of sequencing. Unlike the earlier proposal, which recognised the need for capacity building, tariff reform, labour safeguards, and regulatory strengthening before structural changes, the new framework attempts to do everything at once. This “gazette-first, fix-later” approach has alarmed engineers responsible for grid stability, who warn that institutional confusion during the transition could jeopardise system reliability.

Trade unions say employee assurances promised during negotiations including pension protections, career progression, and fund security remain unfulfilled. More critically, they argue that the new structure blurs accountability during emergencies, particularly if system operations and maintenance are fragmented without tested coordination mechanisms.

Another key concern is IMF conditionality. While restructuring the power sector is a cornerstone of Sri Lanka’s bailout programme, insiders say the current plan reflects deadline-driven compliance rather than locally grounded reform. The Wickremesinghe-era roadmap allowed room for parliamentary oversight, stakeholder buy-in, and pilot implementation. The present approach risks reducing reform to a box-ticking exercise, vulnerable to political reversal and industrial unrest.

With 24 electricity trade unions threatening immediate industrial action, the government faces a stark choice: pause and recalibrate the restructuring to restore confidence, or push ahead and risk operational paralysis. As Sri Lanka’s past power crises have shown, when reform is rushed and trust is ignored, the lights tend to go out literally.

The Board of Investment of Sri Lanka (BOI) has celebrated a significant milestone in 2025, claiming that foreign direct investment inflows exceeded $1 billion an increase of 72% over the previous year. While this announcement has been presented as proof of renewed global confidence and institutional transformation, deeper scrutiny of the BOI’s calculation methods raises serious doubts about the actual FDI position in Sri Lanka.

A closer look at the data reveals that only $167 million of the reported $1,057 million inflows came from equity capital. The remaining sum comprises $213 million in re-invested earnings, $567 million in intra-company borrowings, and $110 million in foreign commercial borrowings. In other words, more than three-quarters of the FDI inflows are not new foreign money entering the country, but financial manoeuvres within existing multinational structures or external loans that do not directly improve Sri Lanka’s foreign currency reserves.

This raises a key question: is Sri Lanka truly attracting fresh international investment, or is the BOI simply repackaging internal financial movements as FDI?

The practice of counting intra-company loans and re-invested earnings as FDI has been criticized globally for inflating investment figures. Unlike equity capital, these flows do not represent a fresh transfer of foreign assets into the host economy. In fact, intra-company borrowings can be easily reversed, and re-invested earnings simply indicate that existing investors are reinvesting profits already generated locally an accounting entry rather than a new inflow.

If Sri Lanka’s FDI statistics are dominated by such components, the real signal of investor confidence is weakened. Equity inflows are widely regarded as the most reliable indicator of new foreign investment because they reflect long-term commitments, job creation, and transfer of technology. Yet in 2025, equity made up only 16% of the BOI’s reported FDI.

Furthermore, the BOI’s heavy reliance on “continuation and expansion projects” suggests that much of the reported investment is tied to existing businesses rather than fresh entrants. Only 13% of total inflows came from new projects approved in the year, which questions the sustainability of the claimed recovery.

The BOI’s presentation of the figures appears designed to signal success and build confidence. But if the statistics are not grounded in actual capital inflows, the government risks overstating economic resilience at a time when Sri Lanka desperately needs genuine foreign investment to stabilise its economy.

The United States has formally completed its withdrawal from the World Health Organization (WHO), according to a joint announcement made on Thursday by US Health Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr. and Secretary of State Marco Rubio.

In a statement, the officials said the decision was driven by what they described as the WHO’s failures during the COVID-19 pandemic. They confirmed that all US funding to the agency has been halted and that any remaining engagement will be limited to finalising procedural aspects of the withdrawal.

UN spokesperson Stephane Dujarric confirmed that the United States is no longer participating in the WHO’s activities. Meanwhile, WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus said the organisation has already implemented budget cuts to address the funding gap created by the US exit.

Prime Minister and Minister of Education, Higher Education and Vocational Education, Dr. Harini Amarasuriya said she is prepared to step down from the post of Prime Minister whenever the people of the country decide that a change is needed.

She made these remarks in Parliament this afternoon while participating in a parliamentary debate, after returning from the 2026 World Economic Forum Annual Meeting in Davos, Switzerland.

Addressing the House, the Prime Minister said that attempts had been made to remove both the President and the Prime Minister, adding that she was fully prepared to face a no-confidence motion if one was brought forward.

“I came this morning ready to face the no-confidence motion. We are still waiting,” she said.

Dr. Amarasuriya stressed that there was no need for political manoeuvres, stating that her Government remained accountable to the people.

“When the people of this country decide that the Prime Minister must change, we are ready to go home. We are accountable to the people, and we will continue to work accordingly,” she said.

The Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB) has announced that its restructuring process will continue and has now reached the final stage.

According to the CEB, the restructuring is being carried out with Sri Lanka’s future electricity needs and long-term objectives in mind.

The Board said the process follows extensive discussions with all relevant stakeholders and shareholders in the electricity sector, ensuring alignment with national energy goals and sector-wide interests.

The Embassy of Sri Lanka in Doha recovered a total of Rs. 197,719,710.36 in 2025 as compensation on behalf of the next of kin (NOKs) of Sri Lankan nationals who passed away in Qatar, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Employment and Tourism said.

Of the total amount recovered, Rs. 23,641,182.00 was directly paid to the respective NOKs through the Embassy, while Rs. 174,078,528.36 was remitted to the Ministry for onward disbursement in Sri Lanka. Several of the settlements related to long-pending cases dating back to 2014.

The recovery process was carried out through coordinated efforts involving Sri Lanka’s Ambassador in Doha, Sithara Khan; Minister of the Embassy, Dharmasiri Wijewardane; and Translator M. R. M. Fiyas, in collaboration with relevant companies, the Consular Affairs Division of the Ministry, the Government of Qatar, and the legal firm appointed by the Embassy.

In 2024, the Embassy had recovered Rs. 172,992,764.43 as compensation, which was successfully disbursed to the affected families in Sri Lanka.