Technology Alone Cannot Secure Sri Lanka’s Maritime Future

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Sri Lanka’s maritime security ambitions are increasingly being tested by a difficult reality: sophisticated technology does not automatically produce effective security. Without capable institutions, reliable information-sharing and the expertise to interpret and act on data, even advanced surveillance systems can leave critical vulnerabilities unresolved.

This was a central theme at a cross-sectoral discussion on maritime security and technological capabilities held by the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies (RCSS), where participants examined how emerging technologies are transforming maritime security while simultaneously creating new dependencies and risks.

Shayan Peris, addressing the discussion, explained that Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) was evolving beyond conventional vessel tracking. The integration of Automatic Identification Systems (AIS), radar, satellite imagery and artificial intelligence is enabling authorities to identify anomalous activity and support more targeted responses.

However, the expansion of technological capabilities also introduces new challenges. The more maritime security depends on interconnected digital systems, the greater the potential consequences of cyber vulnerabilities, unreliable connectivity and weak institutional coordination.

Peris highlighted the growing convergence between maritime and digital security, including risks to ports and other critical infrastructure. Ports are essential to Sri Lanka’s trade and economic resilience, but their dependence on digital systems makes them vulnerable to disruptions that may originate outside traditional maritime security environments.

Submarine cable networks represent another critical concern. These systems are central to international connectivity, yet their protection requires cooperation between maritime authorities, telecommunications regulators, technology providers and international partners. A failure to integrate these responsibilities could create gaps in monitoring and response.

The discussion also examined the expanding use of unmanned and autonomous systems for surveillance, fisheries monitoring, pollution response and search and rescue. Such technologies could improve coverage and reduce operational costs, particularly for a resource-constrained country. Hitherto their deployment raises questions about governance, accountability, data management and the appropriate limits of autonomous decision-making.

For Sri Lanka, the challenge is therefore not simply to acquire more advanced equipment. Peris stressed that the country must develop the institutional capacity to integrate information, retain expertise and act upon it.

This is particularly important where technology systems are purchased from external suppliers. Without domestic technical knowledge, maintenance capabilities and effective oversight, expensive systems may become difficult to sustain or adapt to changing security requirements.

Technological resilience, he argued, depends on operational cyber security, resilient connectivity, effective information-sharing and appropriate governance frameworks for artificial intelligence and autonomous systems.

These requirements also have economic implications. Maritime security failures can disrupt ports, shipping, fisheries, offshore activity and digital services, while weak coordination can reduce the value of investments already made in technology and infrastructure.

The discussion, which brought together public officials, diplomats, security personnel, academics, researchers, technology practitioners and civil society representatives, highlighted the need for a coordinated national response.

Sri Lanka’s maritime future will not be secured by technology alone. It will depend on whether the country can build the institutions, skills and governance systems needed to turn technological innovation into dependable national capability.