The National Police Commission’s decision to cancel the proposed transfers of Senior Deputy Inspector General Ranmal Kodithuwakku, DIG Ashoka Dharmasena and several other officers has added a new dimension to the controversy surrounding the seizure of 463 kilograms of crystal methamphetamine at Colombo Port.
The issue is no longer simply whether senior officers failed to act promptly on intelligence. It now raises a more fundamental question: were the officers genuinely negligent, or did the investigators themselves interpret police procedure beyond the limits of their mandate?
According to the Special Investigation Unit inquiry, Kodithuwakku received information on August 14 concerning two containers suspected of carrying narcotics. The information was reportedly passed to the Police Narcotics Bureau on the same day. Yet the decisive operational action came later, after Sub-Inspector Ekanayake of the Central Crime Investigation Bureau received the information on August 22.
On August 31, CCIB officers, assisted by the PNB and Customs, opened the container under a court-authorised search and discovered 463 kilograms of Ice concealed among towels or body wipes. Police subsequently arrested several suspects.
The Special Investigation Unit has interpreted the sequence as possible dereliction of duty and recommended that a criminal investigation be considered. The IGP consequently instructed the CID to establish whether the alleged failure to act was deliberate and whether it created circumstances favourable to any particular party.
That is a substantially more serious allegation than administrative negligence.
But the chronology also requires closer examination.
Receiving intelligence does not automatically mean that an officer can immediately enter a port container, seize cargo or arrest suspects. Such actions normally require operational verification, coordination with Customs and other agencies, legal authority and, where applicable, a judicial search order. Indeed, the official Police account states that CCIB officers obtained a search order from the Aluthgama Magistrate’s Court before inspecting the container.
Therefore, the central investigative question should be whether the officers followed the legally prescribed intelligence-to-operation procedure, rather than simply whether they personally opened the container immediately after receiving the information.
The distinction is crucial.
If Kodithuwakku communicated the intelligence to the appropriate specialist unit on August 14, responsibility for subsequent verification and operational action may have passed through established institutional channels. Conversely, if an officer with direct responsibility for narcotics intelligence deliberately suppressed, delayed or failed to escalate credible information despite having a mandatory duty to act, disciplinary or criminal consequences could follow.
The CID therefore has a difficult task. It must distinguish between poor performance, procedural delay, negligence and intentional obstruction.
The NPC’s cancellation of the transfers does not exonerate anyone. Nor does the SIU finding establish criminal liability. The Commission has merely refused the proposed transfers, including those involving senior PNB officers.
The investigation must consequently establish the exact chain of responsibility, documentary communications, intelligence logs, court applications, operational orders and timelines.
Until those records are examined, branding an officer criminally negligent could itself become an administrative injustice.
The Colombo Port drug seizure deserves a transparent investigation—but one based on procedure, evidence and jurisdiction rather than hindsight.