The arrest of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro by U.S. forces in early 2026 has done more than just decapitate a regime; it has acted as the definitive catalyst for a seismic shift in global geopolitics. As we move further into this decade, the post-World War II “liberal international order” defined by global institutions, universal rules, and American policing of every corner of the globe is visibly crumbling. In its place, a “New World Order” is emerging, defined not by international law, but by a return to 19th-century-style spheres of influence.

This transformation suggests that the 21st century will be multipolar, transactional, and divided among three dominant “hegemons”: the United States, Russia, and China.

The “Don-roe Doctrine” and the Venezuelan Pivot

The recent U.S. military operation in Caracas represents a “Major Pivot” in American foreign policy under the second Trump administration. Critics and supporters alike have dubbed this the “Donroe Doctrine” a modern, aggressive revival of the 1823 Monroe Doctrine. By forcibly removing Maduro and signaling an intent to “run” Venezuela to extract its vast oil reserves, the U.S. is sending a clear message: The Western Hemisphere is American territory.

This move is driven by two existential pressures:

Economic Survival: With China’s economy projected to surpass the U.S. in scale and technological self-sufficiency within this decade, Washington is desperate to secure tangible resources. Control over Venezuela’s oil, the largest proven reserves on Earth, provides a strategic hedge against China’s dominance in green energy and manufacturing.

Domestic Distraction: As noted by various political analysts, when domestic popularity wanes or economic collapses loom, leaders often seek “foreign adventures” to galvanize public support. The arrest of Maduro, framed as a strike against “narco-terrorism,” serves as a powerful narrative for a populist administration facing internal pressures.

The Silent Pact: A Tripartite Accommodation?

The most startling aspect of the 2026 Venezuela crisis is the lack of meaningful interference from Moscow or Beijing. While both nations issued formal condemnations at the UN, their actions or lack thereof suggest a deeper, more cynical understanding between the “Big Three.”

War experts argue that we are witnessing a grand bargain. In this “New World Order,” the superpowers have tacitly agreed to respect each other’s “backyards”:

The Americas for the U.S.: Russia and China have essentially traded their support for Maduro in exchange for U.S. non-interference in their respective regional ambitions.

Ukraine and Eastern Europe for Russia: As the U.S. diverts military resources and political capital to the Caribbean and South America, its appetite for the Ukraine-Russia conflict has evaporated. This paves the way for a settlement where Russia maintains control over its captured territories and asserts a “security sphere” over Eastern Europe.

The South China Sea and Taiwan for China: With the U.S. focused on its own hemisphere, the “unbreakable intention” of Beijing to bring Taiwan under its control becomes a regional matter rather than a global flashpoint.

The Abandonment of Europe and the Death of Universalism

The biggest loser in this emerging order is the European Union. For decades, Europe relied on the U.S. security umbrella and a rules-based system. Now, Europe finds itself “on its own.” The U.S. shift toward unilateralism and regional dominance signals that it no longer views itself as the “guardian of democracy” in Europe.

This creates a vacuum. As the U.S. withdraws from the Ukraine conflict to secure Venezuelan oil, Europe is left with a massive security bill and a resurgent Russia on its doorstep. The era of “Global Britain” or a “United Europe” is being crushed between the tectonic plates of the U.S., Russia, and China.

A Multipolar Century

History teaches us that world orders change roughly every century. The 19th century was British; the 20th was American. The 21st century is shaping up to be a Multipolar Era where sovereignty is only for the strong.

The arrest of Maduro is not an isolated event; it is the “Nethniyahu Theory” applied on a global scale using regional conflict to maintain domestic power while carving out a piece of the world for one’s own. As the U.S. secures the West, China secures the East, and Russia secures the North, the “International Community” is being replaced by three distinct fortresses. This may prevent a World War III by keeping the giants from stepping on each other’s toes, but it does so at the cost of the freedom and sovereignty of smaller nations.

In a “New World Order” defined by the rigid spheres of influence discussed above, Sri Lanka’s unique geography, once its greatest asset, becomes a precarious liability. As the U.S., Russia, and China carve up the globe, Sri Lanka finds itself at the epicenter of the Indo-Pacific “seam,” where these spheres of influence overlap and collide.

1. Economic Impact: The Energy Pivot and Debt Diplomacy

The U.S. seizure of Venezuelan oil has immediate, localized consequences for Sri Lanka. While global prices might stabilize under U.S. control, the “petrodollar” becomes a tool of geopolitical compliance.

Energy Costs and the Dollar Peg: If the U.S. uses its new Venezuelan oil dominance to reward allies, Sri Lanka—already struggling with foreign exchange reserves—could face a “loyalty tax” on fuel imports. If Colombo drifts too close to the China sphere, it may find itself cut off from affordable U.S.-controlled crude, forcing a costly transition to Russian or Middle Eastern supplies.

Trade Fragmentation: As the WTO weakens, Sri Lanka’s garment and tea exports face a world of regional “fortress” tariffs. The U.S. and EU (moving toward protectionism) may restrict access unless Sri Lanka aligns with Western security goals. Conversely, China’s “Belt and Road” projects in the island will demand deeper integration into the yuan-based trade block.

2. Political Impact: The End of “Non-Alignment”

For decades, Sri Lanka practiced a policy of “friendship with all, enmity with none.” In this new century, that middle ground is disappearing.

Pressure to Choose: As Russia secures Eastern Europe and China dominates the South China Sea, both will demand that Sri Lanka provides “dual-use” facilities (ports that can serve both trade and military needs). The U.S., desperate to maintain its waning influence in Asia, will counter this with intense diplomatic pressure, potentially using IMF debt restructuring as a “carrot or stick.”

Democratic vs. Autocratic Influence: The “Netanyahu Theory” of domestic survival via foreign conflict may embolden local populist movements. If global hegemons prioritize “stability and spheres” over “human rights and democracy,” Sri Lanka’s domestic governance may shift toward a more authoritarian, security-first model, modeled after the very leaders currently reshaping the world.

3. Military Impact: A Permanent Maritime Frontier

Militarily, the island becomes a “stationary aircraft carrier” in the contest for the Indian Ocean.

Naval Encroachment: If the U.S. is “distracted” by its Western Hemisphere focus, India acting as a regional deputy will likely increase its military footprint in Sri Lanka to block Chinese naval expansion. This places the Sri Lankan military in a difficult position: conducting joint exercises with the U.S./India while hosting Chinese-built infrastructure at Hambantota.

Intelligence and Surveillance: The island’s strategic value for underwater cable monitoring and satellite tracking will make it a target for “hybrid warfare.” Cyber-interference and the installation of advanced radar systems by foreign powers will compromise Sri Lanka’s military sovereignty.

Conclusion: The Fortress or the Bridge?

Sri Lanka’s survival in this new world order depends on whether it can remain a “bridge” between these three fortresses or if it is swallowed by one of them. The 2026 Venezuela crisis proves that the U.S. is willing to act unilaterally when its interests are at stake; Sri Lanka must now prepare for a world where “might is right” and regional proximity to a hegemon is the only law.

(The writer is an Infantry Officer who served the Sri Lanka Army for over 36 years, dedicating 20 of those to active combat. In addition to his military service, Dr. Perera is a respected International Researcher and Writer, having authored more than 200 research articles and 16 books. He holds a PhD in economics and is an entrepreneur and International Analyst specialising in National Security, economics and politics. He can be reached at [email protected])

Sri Lanka’s proposal to transform the Employees’ Provident Fund (EPF) from a lump-sum retirement payout into a monthly pension marks one of the most significant potential reforms in private sector social security. Announced in early 2026 and reiterated in Parliament by Deputy Minister of Labour Mahinda Jayasinghe, the initiative aims to provide long-term financial stability for millions of private sector workers who currently exit employment with a single payment and no guaranteed post-retirement income.

The rationale behind the proposal is clear. While the EPF was designed as a safety net for retirement, lump-sum payments often expose retirees to financial risk. Poor financial planning, inflation, rising healthcare costs, and longer life expectancy mean that many retirees exhaust their EPF savings within a few years. In contrast, a pension-style system would provide a steady monthly income, similar to what public sector employees receive, ensuring sustained income security throughout retirement.

Under the proposed framework, EPF and the Employees’ Trust Fund (ETF) may be restructured into a part-pension fund under the Treasury. Retiring members would have options: withdraw a portion as a lump sum while converting the balance into a monthly pension, or withdraw the full amount at retirement. Officials have noted that legislative amendments to the EPF Act would be required, as the current structure does not qualify as a pension scheme. Discussions on funding mechanisms and governance reforms are already underway, with amendments anticipated following policy groundwork laid in late 2025.

From a feasibility standpoint, the reform has several advantages. Sri Lanka’s ageing population and shrinking workforce make pension sustainability a national priority. Converting EPF into a pension-style system could reduce future elderly poverty and lessen reliance on state welfare. Pooling funds over longer periods may also allow more strategic, long-term investments, potentially improving returns for contributors.

However, viability depends heavily on governance, transparency, and trust. EPF funds have historically been managed by the Central Bank, and the proposal suggests moving oversight under the Treasury an idea that raises concerns about political interference. Past attempts, notably in 2011, collapsed amid public protests fueled by fears that workers’ savings would be used to finance government deficits.

There are also structural challenges. Pension liabilities are long-term commitments, requiring actuarial discipline, robust regulation, and insulation from short-term fiscal pressures. Without these safeguards, a pension scheme could become financially unsustainable or erode contributor confidence.

In essence, transforming the EPF into a pension fund is conceptually sound and socially beneficial, but its success hinges on design integrity. If implemented with strong legal protections, member choice, and transparent management, it could redefine retirement security for Sri Lanka’s private sector. Without them, it risks becoming another well-intentioned reform undermined by execution.

Sri Lanka’s continued reliance on the IMF-led debt restructuring framework may offer short-term stability, but critics warn it also carries serious long-term risks particularly if the country deviates from promised reforms or if the programme itself proves too rigid to absorb new shocks.

The ongoing restructuring rests on strict targets set by the IMF’s Debt Sustainability Analysis, which aims to restore market confidence and prevent a repeat of the 2022 default. Yet even the IMF has acknowledged that Sri Lanka’s recovery path is “knife-edged,” with a significant probability of renewed debt distress if growth falters or external shocks intensify.

Recent cyclone damage has exposed these vulnerabilities. Reconstruction is expected to cost between US$6–7 billion, far exceeding available foreign exchange reserves. At the same time, external debt servicing continues to absorb a large share of government revenue, leaving little room for emergency spending without breaching IMF targets.

Supporters of the programme argue that deviating from IMF conditions would jeopardise access to concessional financing and scare off investors. Any unilateral suspension of debt repayments, they warn, could undermine credibility and delay Sri Lanka’s return to international capital markets.

However, critics counter that rigid compliance carries its own dangers. Continuing repayments while borrowing more for recovery simply shifts the burden into the future, increasing the risk of another restructuring. Moreover, heavy dependence on external discipline limits the government’s ability to respond democratically to voter demands for social protection, climate resilience, and inclusive growth.

There is also the question of fairness. Private creditors, particularly holders of international sovereign bonds, benefited from high interest rates during boom years. If Sri Lanka is forced to maintain harsh fiscal adjustments to satisfy these creditors, public trust in both domestic institutions and the international financial system may erode further.

Deviating from the IMF programme is not without cost, but neither is blind adherence. Failure to adapt targets to new realities such as climate disasters or global downturns could lock Sri Lanka into a cycle of low growth, social strain, and repeated debt renegotiations.

The debate ultimately centres on sovereignty and risk-sharing. A more flexible approach, critics argue, would involve deeper debt relief, temporary suspension of repayments during crises, and greater recognition of climate-related losses. Without such adjustments, Sri Lanka may technically remain “on programme” while remaining economically fragile.

As restructuring talks continue, policymakers face a stark choice: prioritise credibility with creditors at all costs, or recalibrate the programme to ensure long-term sustainability and social stability before another crisis forces the issue.

Sri Lanka’s fragile recovery is being tested not only by external pressures but also by internal contradictions that continue to blur policy direction and weaken investor confidence. While the government projects stability and reform, inconsistencies in political messaging, economic management, and foreign policy are raising concerns about whether the country is fully prepared for the next phase of its recovery.

At the heart of the challenge is governance coherence. The ruling coalition brings together ideologically diverse forces, ranging from pragmatic reformists to hardline Marxists. This ideological tension often spills into public discourse, creating confusion among international partners and domestic stakeholders alike. Recent mixed signals on foreign policy, particularly regarding major global powers, highlight the risks of speaking in multiple voices in an interconnected world.

Economically, Sri Lanka has made measurable progress since its debt default, with growth hovering around 3.9% in 2024 and 2025. Manufacturing, construction, and services have shown resilience, and macroeconomic stability has improved. However, this recovery remains shallow and vulnerable. High exposure to external shocks such as shifting trade policies, energy price volatility, and weakening global demand continues to loom large.

The ongoing tariff dispute with the United States underscores these vulnerabilities. Although reciprocal tariffs have been reduced to 20%, they remain at historically high levels and disproportionately affect export-dependent sectors like apparel and rubber. Thousands of jobs are at risk, and export earnings are under pressure at a time when foreign exchange inflows are critical.

Beyond trade, structural weaknesses persist. Productivity growth remains sluggish, investment levels are below potential, and policy execution often lags behind rhetoric. Weather-related disruptions, especially floods and droughts, are increasingly affecting agriculture and infrastructure, while dependence on remittances from the Middle East exposes the economy to geopolitical and labor-market shifts beyond Colombo’s control.

Constructive criticism must also address political accountability. While the government emphasizes transparency and reform, public trust hinges on consistent decision-making, clear communication, and demonstrable outcomes. Investors and development partners look for predictability not ideological posturing or mixed signals that can undermine confidence.

Yet opportunities remain. Sri Lanka’s strategic location in the Indo-Pacific, its educated workforce, and improving tourism prospects provide a foundation for sustainable growth. Deepening trade partnerships, investing in climate resilience, and accelerating digital and technological adoption could help insulate the economy from external shocks.

Ultimately, Sri Lanka’s challenge is not merely economic but institutional. Recovery will depend on aligning political ideology with economic reality, ensuring foreign policy discipline, and translating reform promises into tangible results. Without that alignment, progress risks stalling just as the country begins to regain its footing.

A special awareness programme on the Proceeds of Crime Act, No. 5 of 2025, was conducted yesterday (06) at the Ministry of Defence, with the objective of educating security and legal leadership on the complexities of illicit wealth recovery.

Held under the guidance of Defence Secretary Air Vice Marshal Sampath Thuyacontha (Retd), the programme focused on key statutory obligations relating to the disclosure of information and the legal consequences of failing to do so, in support of the national effort to dismantle organised financial crime, the Ministry of Defence said in a statement.

The keynote lecture was delivered by Additional Solicitor General Air Commodore Sudarshana De Silva, PC, who also serves as the Judge Advocate of the Sri Lanka Air Force. Addressing senior officers of the Tri-Forces, legal professionals and senior civil officials, Air Commodore De Silva provided a comprehensive analysis of the legislation, which has been in force since June 01, 2025.

During his presentation, he highlighted the stringent disclosure requirements under the Act, explaining that any individual or official who becomes aware of suspected proceeds of crime is legally required to report such information to the relevant authorities. He further emphasised that willful blindness or failure to disclose such information constitutes a serious offence under the law and could result in severe legal penalties.

The programme underscored the Ministry of Defence’s commitment to ensuring that senior leadership within the Tri-Forces and the civil administration are fully conversant with the latest legal frameworks. By strengthening high-level legal literacy, the Ministry aims to enhance transparency and reinforce efforts to identify and disrupt illicit financial networks.

The event concluded with an interactive discussion session, during which participants examined the practical application of the Act in maintaining the highest standards of integrity and discipline within the country’s security and administrative structures.

The Additional Secretary (Administration), senior Tri-Forces officers, legal professionals, and senior officials from the civil and legal services were present at the programme.